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The Entrapment Defense and the 
Procedural Issues: Burden of 
Proof, Questions of Law and 
Fact, Inconsistent Defenses 
By Paul Marcus· 
Dean Marcus has produced an extremely thorough article on the 
intriguing and complex defense of entrapment. After analyzing the 
subjective and objective approaches to the defense, the author turns 
to the infrequently addressed question of evidence on predisposi-
tion. Included here are the recent ABSCAM cases. 
Finally, the author explores the vagaries of inconsistent defenses 
and, on the whole , provides academics and practitioners with a 
refreshing and useful guide to some of the most important questions 
involving entrapment. 
For most of this century an intense debate has raged invol v-
ing practicing lawyers, judges, and law professors concerning 
the defense of entrapment. I Little question has been raised as to 
whether we should recognize an entrapment defense. 2 The con-
troversy has , instead, focused chiefly on two questions. The 
first issue is the reason for having an entrapment defense. A 
majority of Supreme Court judges3 have taken the view that the 
reason for having an entrapment defense is that the legislature 
could never have intended to allow convictions for crimes 
where the accused was pressured by the government into com-
mitting the crime. The classic, and concise, statement in sup-
port of this point of view was expressed by Chief Justice War-
ren in Sherman v. United States: "Congress could not have 
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona. 
1 For two different views of the debate, see Park, "The Entrapment Contro-
versy," 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163 (1976); Groot, "The Serpent Beguiled Me and I 
(Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and the Entrapment Defense," 1973 U. 
Ill. L.F. 254. 
2 The defense was "firmly recognized" in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 
(l932), and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
3 The view was first put forth by Chief Justice Hughes in Sorrells. 287 U.S. at 448. 
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intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting inno-
cent persons into violations."4 
The contrary view was, perhaps, best stated by Justice 
Frankfurter who viewed the purpose for the entrapment defense 
as deterring improper police conduct. As he wrote in the Sher-
man case: 
Id. 
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant , not because his 
conduct falls outside the proscription of the statute , but because , even if 
his guilt be admitted , the methods employed on behalf of the Govern-
ment to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced. * * * Insofar 
as they are used as instrumentalities in the administration of criminal 
justice , the federal courts have an obligation to set their face against 
enforcement of the law by lawless means or means that violate rationally 
vindicated standards of justice, and to refuse to sustain such methods by 
effectuating them. They do this in the exercise of a recognized jurisdic-
tion to formulate and apply' 'proper standards for the enforcement of the 
federal criminal law in the federal courts, " an obligation that goes 
beyond the conviction of the particular defendant before the court. 
Public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of justice , 
upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is the transcending value 
at stake.5 
4 356 U.S. at 372. He explained: 
The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension 
of criminals. Manifestly , that function does not include the manufacturing of 
crime . Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in 
the arsenal of the police officer. However, " A different question is presented 
when the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they 
implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged 
offense and induce a commission in order that they may prosecute ." Then stealth 
and strategy become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession. 
5 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He , too, explained further: 
It is surely sheer fiction to suggest that a conviction cannot be had when a 
defendant has been entrapped by government officers or informers because 
" Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be e·nforced by 
tempting innocent persons into violations. " In those cases raising claims of 
entrapment, the only legislative intention that can with any show of reason be 
extracted from the statute is the intention to make criminal precisely the conduct 
in which the defendant has engaged. That conduct excludes all the elements 
necessary to constitute criminality. Without compulsion and " knowingly," 
where that is requisite, the defendant has violated the statutory command. Ifhe is 
to be relieved from the usual punitive consequences, it is on no account because 
he is innocent of the offense described. In these circumstances, conduct is not 
less criminal because the result of temptation, whether the tempter is a private 
person or a government agent or informer. 
ld. at 379-380. 
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The second issue is a corollary of the first. Depending on 
which rationale one accepts for the defense, the test utilized 
follows inexorably. Thus, for those judges who follow the ma-
jority view, looking to the conduct of the suspect, a "subjec-
tive" test has been generally used in which the predisposition of 
the defendant is of principal concern. 
[We] recognize "that the fact that officers or employees of the govern-
ment merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the 
offense does not defeat the prosecution." Nor will the mere fact of 
deceit defeat a prosecution, for there are circumstances when the use of 
deceit is the only practicable law enforcement technique available. It is 
only when the Government's deception actually implants the criminal 
design in the mind of the defendant that the defense of entrapment 
comes into play. 6 
For those who follow the position put forth by Justice 
Frankfurter, an "objective" test has been used, looking to the 
conduct of the police as opposed to that of the suspect. 
The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct 
itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls 
below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use 
of governmental power. For answer it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the 
.. intention" to commit the crime originated with the defendant or gov-
ernment officers, or if the criminal conduct was the product of "the 
creative activity" of law-enforcement officials. Yet in the present case 
the Court repeats and purports to apply these unrevealing tests. Of 
course in every case of this kind the intention that the particular crime be 
committed originates with the police, and without their inducement the 
crime would not have occurred. But it is perfectly clear [as] where the 
police [simply furnish] the opportunity for the commission of the crime, 
that this is not enough to enable the defendant to escape conviction. 7 
The debate over these two points continues. 8 Some states 
that have traditionally followed the Supreme Court's role in the 
criminal procedure area have rejected the subjective view and 
instead look to the objective test. 9 Other states have flirted with 
one or the other ultimately adopting a combination of the two. 10 
6 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-436 (1973). 
7 Shennan v. United States, 356 U.S. at 382. 
8 See generally, Park, note I supra. 
9 See, e.g., California v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1979). 
10 E.g., New Jersey v. Rockholt, 476 A.2d 1236 (N.J. 1984). 
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Some of the most important issues concerning the entrapment 
defense have little to do with this debate, however. Many of the 
practice-oriented questions involving entrapment deal with the 
procedures utilized at trial. Surprisingly, relatively little has 
been written concerning this and the debate over these various 
questions has been mild in comparison. I I 
For a lawyer who wishes to analyze the entrapment defense 
and determine its applicability in a criminal prosecution, how-
ever, the procedural issues can be paramount. In particular, 
issues surrounding the burden of proof, questions of law and 
fact, and the so-called inconsistent defense doctrine can often 
be determinative of the ultimate question. In this article these 
three areas will be analyzed, reviewing their status under both 
the majority-subjective defense and the minority-objective de-
fense. 
The Burden of Proof 
Many courts take very different views as to the purposes of 
the defense of entrapment and the way in which evidence shall 
be presented in connection with this defense. These different 
views are reflected quite clearly with respect to the burden of 
proof as to entrapment. Courts that follow the "subjective" 
approach to entrapment differ considerably from those that 
adhere to the "objective" approach. Moreover, even courts 
that follow the same substantive test for entrapment may differ 
when it comes to formulating the standards of proof and the 
manner in which proof shall be offered as to this defense. 
The Subjective Approach 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to discuss the 
precise burden of proof issue , in the majority of jurisdictions the 
matter has been resolved by reliance on a famous opinion by 
Judge Learned Hand. In United States v. Sherman,1 2 the court 
discussed the burden of proof issue as involving two questions 
of "fact." The first of these is, Did the agent induce the ac-
cused to commit the offense charged in the indictment? The 
second is, If so, was the accused ready and willing without 
II But see Groot, note I supra. 
12 200 F.2d 800, 882 (2d Cir. 1952). 
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persuasion and was he awaiting any propitious opportunity to 
commit the offense? The first element is generally referred to 
as the inducement factor, the second as the accused's predis-
position. Under the Hand formulation, the burden of proving 
the first element generally is on the defendant. The government 
shoulders the burden of proving predisposition. 
The Hand approach has been recognized as the classic for-
mulation and has been relied on in numerous cases. The Second 
Circuit in United States v. Braver 13 pointed out that the courts 
had "bifurcated the defense of entrapment into two elements, 
inducement and propensity. "14 As to the former, the defendant 
had the burden; as to the latter, the burden was on the govern-
ment. The court went on to "recognize that this analysis of the 
entrapment defense is based upon Judge Learned Hand's opin-
ion in United Sta te s v. Sherman." (5 
In some ways, the standard formulated by Judge Hand, and 
readily accepted throughout the country, created more prob-
lems than it resolved. Several matters in particular are of impor-
tance in determining the nature of the defendant's burden in a 
showing of entrapment. The first relates to the concept of "in-
ducement" in the Hand formulation. The Second Circuit had 
initially defined it very broadly so as to include "soliciting, 
proposing, initiating, broaching, or suggesting." 16 As pointed 
out by Judge Friendly, however, this definition of inducement 
"goes simply to the government's initiation of the crime and not 
to the degree of pressure exerted. "17 Hence, under the original 
Hand formulation, the defense could be raised simply with a 
showing of any government solicitation or initiation. Many 
courts rebelled against such a broad view either by narrowing 
the definition of "inducement" or by placing a burden on the 
defendant with respect to a showing of lack of predisposition. 
As indicated above, a literal definition of Judge Hand's 
formulation would include almost all government contacts that 
13 450 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1971). 
14/d. at 801; see also United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 1491, 1499 (lith Cir. 
1985). 
I S 200 F.2d 800 n.5; see generally United States v. Stanley, 765 F.2d 1224, 
1234-1235 (lith Cir. 1985). 
16 In Sherman, 200 F.2d at 883. 
17 United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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tended to initiate criminal activity. Many courts today, how-
ever, take a narrower view and require a much greater showing 
by the defendant. The experience in the Ninth Circuit is both 
illuminating and somewhat surprising. 
In Notaro v. United States, 18 the court dealt with the ques-
tion of burden of proof in the area of entrapment. In its conclu-
sion, the court very broadly noted that "if the defense of en-
trapment is claimed, a showing, however presented, that the 
commission of the offense was attended by the intervention of a 
government agent is sufficient." 19 The Ninth Circuit (by the 
same judge who had written the Notaro opinion) suggested in 
another case that such language should not be literally applied; 
otherwise the entrapment issue would arise in all cases in which 
government agents even attempted to make a contact for the 
purchase of narcotics. It is not enough, the court stated in 
United States v. Christopher, "that the government furnished 
the opportunity for the commission of a crime ... (there must 
still be] some evidence of inducement or persuasion by the 
government. "20 What that persuasion would be, however, has 
not been defined by the courts, though most are reluctant to 
allow the defense to be raised simply on the basis of proof of 
some government contact. 21 
For those courts that have attempted to require more of the 
defendant than simply a showing of inducement, the approach 
has taken two forms. Some courts have adopted a so-called 
18 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966). 
191d. at 174 n.6. 
20 488 F.2d 849, 850-851 (9th Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Andrews, 765 
F.2d 1491, 1499 (l1th Cir. 1985). 
21 See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 165-169 (5th Cir. 1969), cut. 
denied, 396 U.S. 960; see also United States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1069,1071 (4th Cir. 
1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S. 950: .. solicitation by itself is not the kind of conduct that 
would persuade an otherwise innocent person to commit a crime." This view is 
expressed in many of the modem jury instructions. Typical of this approach is that 
found in the District of Columbia Bar Association's, Criminal Jury Instructions No. 
5.03 (3d ed. 1978), which contains a narrow definition of the term inducement: 
Inducement by law enforcement officials may take many forms including persua-
sion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises 
of reward or pleas based on need, sympathy or friendship. A solicitation, request 
or approach by law enforcement officials to engage in criminal activity, standing 
alone, is not an inducement. 
See discussion in United States V. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 911-914 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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unitary standard. See, for instance, Kadis v. United States. 22 
The court there centered its attention on both a showing of 
inducement and proof of non-predisposition. 
If the defendant shows , through government witnesses or otherwise , 
some indication that a government agent corrupted him, the burden of 
disproving entrapment will be on the government; but such a showing is 
not made simply by evidence of a solicitation. There must be some 
evidence tending to show unreadiness. 23 
The other approach, most prominently put forth by the 
Second Circuit, requires a "more cumbersome procedural 
mechanism. "24 Under this rule, if the defendant offers some 
evidence of government initiation of the criminal activity, the 
prosecution then must demonstrate defendant's predisposition. 
At that point, however, if the prosecution satisfies the burden, 
the defendant must then come forward and demonstrate evi-
dence of lack of predisposition. Unless such evidence of lack of 
predisposition is demonstrated , the defendant is not entitled to 
an instruction on entrapment even though the defendant previ-
ously showed some government initiation. 25 
Both approaches create rather obvious difficulties. The pro-
cedures in both cases tend to be awkward, at best. Moreover, 
they both tend to defeat the essential point of the Hand formula-
tion, that the defendant should have no burden with respect to 
the nature of the government contact, but that the government 
should have to prove that "the accused [was] ready and willing 
22 373 F.2d 370, 374 (1st CiT. 1967). 
23 See also United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1079 (5th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950. 
24 As stated by Judge McGowan in United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903,914, 
(D.C . Cir. 1978). The Burkley opinion is a thoughtful analysis of the procedural 
problems connected with the entrapment defense. 
2S In the Riley case , 363 F.2d 955,958 (2d Cir. 1966), Judge Friendly discussed the 
principle: 
[E]ven when inducement has been shown, submission to the jury is not required if 
uncontradicted proof has established that the accused was " ready and willing 
without persuasion" and to have been " awaiting any propitious opportunity to 
commit the offense ." In such cases there is no real issue for the jury even though 
in strict theory it might create one by speCUlating that the agents had found the 
defendant less willing than they said. On the other hand, the production of any 
evidence negating propensity, whether in cross-examination or otherwise re-
quire s submission to the jury, however unreasonable the judge would consider a 
verdict in favor of the defendant to be. 
ld. at 959. 
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without persuasion ... to commit the offense. " In addition, 
there is a real question of how a defendant would go about to 
prove the negative, that he was not predisposed. As a conse-
quence, most courts have rejected this unitary standard 
(whether in a single procedure or in two procedures) and have 
avoided the problem by requiring the defendant to make a 
showing as to inducement that involves more than "mere solici-
tation," but that ultimately places the burden of predisposition 
on the government. 
A few courts require very little in the way of a burden on the 
defendant with regard to evidence of entrapment. In these 
courts, the burden is more correctly defined as one of produc-
tion of evidence rather than of persuasion. That is, these courts 
require the defendant only to offer evidence of governmental 
inducement. At that point, the burden shifts to the government 
to prove predisposition. 26 
For those courts that require more than a production of 
evidence, there is a host of possible approaches. Some courts 
speak in terms of ,. any foundation in the evidence" to demon-
strate inducement. 27 Others talk of evidence that amounts to 
"more than a scintilla. "28 Still others refer to the requirement 
that the defendant must put the inducement question . 'in is-
sue. "29 The majority of state and federal courts to consider the 
issue have, however, selected one ofthree approaches concern-
ing the defense burden. The most limited burden is requiring the 
26 See, e .g., Rhode Island v. Jones , 416 A.2d 676, 679 (R.I. 1980); Washington v. 
Ziegler, 575 P.2d 723, 724·725 (Wash. 1978); United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 
1086-1087 (3d eir. 1975). 
27 United States v. Timberlake, 559 F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th eir. 1977). 
28 United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th eir. 1979). 
29 United States v. Woosley, 761 F.2d 445, 448 (8th eir. 1985); but see United 
States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1080 (5th eir. 1985): 
We believe that our previous references to "any evidence" and "more than a 
scintilla" both point in the same direction-that evidence from which a reason-
able juror could derive a reasonable doubt as to the origin of criminal intent and, 
thus entrapment. Entrapment is not raised by special plea but, rather, by iden-
tification or production of evidence. Thus, for the defendant to obtain an entrap-
ment instruction based on the evidence at trial, the evidence ought, at the least, 
provide a basis for a reasonable doubt on whether criminal intent originated with 
the government. This follows because, ifthe evidence of entrapment is sufficient 
to submit the issue to the jury the district court must instruct the jury to acquit 
unless the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
predisposed-that the criminal intent originated with the defendant. 
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defendant to offer "some evidence of government conduct that 
would create a risk of causing an otherwise unpredisposed 
person to commit the crime charged. "30 The second and higher 
standard was recently discussed by the Florida Supreme Court 
in the case of Florida v. Wheeler. 31 "The defendant has the 
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of entrapment. 
The trial court determines the legal sufficiency of the evidence 
of entrapment. If the defendant has not made a prima facie case, 
the defense of entrapment does not go to the jury. ' '32 
Probably the leading standard used is the usual civil eviden-
tiary rule , preponderance of the evidence. This is the principle 
put forth by both the drafters of the Model Penal Code33 and the 
original proposed revised Federal Criminal Code. 34 In short, the 
great likelihood is that in a situation where the usual subjective 
approach to entrapment is raised, the burden on the defendant 
will be to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence the 
issue of entrapment. 3S 
30 United State s v. Burkley, 591 F.2d at 914; see also United States v. Andrews, 
765 F.2d 1491, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985). 
31 468 So. 2d 978 (Aa. 1985). 
Jl Jd. at 981. The court went on to explain that once the jury is instructed on the 
ultimate issue of entrapment- if the defendant has made the prima facie case-the 
jury should not receive any additional information respecting this prima facie case 
burden . 
If, however, a prima facie case is made, the issue of entrapment is submitted to 
the jury with appropriate instruction . . . but the jury is not instructed on the 
defendant's initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. The burden lies with 
the State to disprove entrapment, which is usually done by proving the predispos-
ition of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Jd. ; see also United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 856 (5th Cir. 1985). 
J] Model Penal Code § 2.13(2) places the burden on the defendant to prove" by a 
preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment ... 
One should be wary of placing too much emphasis on both the Model Penal Code and 
the proposed Federal Criminal Code, however, as each involves the objective test, 
not the majority subjective test. See generally Park, "The Entrapment Con-
troversy " 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163,263-266 (1976). For an example of a state statute that 
uses both the subjective standard and the preponderance principle, see Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 11, § 432, 304 (1979). 
J 4 Brown Commission Report § 702(1), dealing with the proposed code , indicates 
that entrapment is an affirmative defense. An earlier section of the proposal notes 
that affirmative defenses place the burden on the defendant "of persuasion by a 
preponderance of the evidence ." National Commission on Reform, Federal Criminal 
Laws 314-317 (1970) (I working papers). 
J5 See, e.g. , New York v. Ventura, 487 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1985); Minnesota v. 
Holbrook, 230 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. 1975); United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799,802 
(2d CiT. 1971). 
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The final point to be raised in connection with these stan-
dards is whether they are different from each other in sub-
stance. As indicated previously, the question that actually arises 
in most cases under the majority-subjective analysis is whether 
predisposition can be shown. That is, in the vast majority of 
cases raising the entrapment question, inducement is clear with 
relatively little doubt. As pointed out by the Fifth Circuit, 
"there is little indication, however, that these semantic dis-
crepancies [some evidence, evidence in the record, etc.] have 
realistically produced disparate results." 36 
For the last decade a constitutional issue has been raised 
with some regularity by defense counsel in the entrapment area, 
though with a singular lack of success. The argument traces a 
line of U.S. Supreme Court cases which discusses the burden of 
proof in criminal cases. Defense lawyers have argued that all 
burdens with respect to the entrapment defense should be on 
the government, beyond a reasonable doubt. The earliest Su-
preme Court case cited dealing with the broad issue of the 
government burden is In re Winship. There, the Court explained 
that each element of each offense must, under the constitution, 
be proved by the government and not the defendant. ,. [T]he 
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. "37 
36 United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301, 1303 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980). It is worth noting 
that the analysis given above applies only in the usual subjective test jurisdictions. 
For a discussion ofthe objective test jurisdictions , see text accompanying notes 52-61 
infra. A few states have unusual rules that do not fit in either category. See, for 
instance, New Jersey v. Rockholt, 476 A.2d 1236 (N.J. 1984), where the court 
interpreted the recent codification of the entrapment rules as combining both the 
objective and the subjective tests. Hence, in New Jersey at this time, "the defendant 
must prove by preponderance of the evidence , that the police conduct constituted 
entrapment by both objective and subjective standards." /d. at 1241. 
37 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Court explained further: 
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has [a] vital role in our 
criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution 
has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that 
he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would 
be stigmatized by the conviction .... 
Moreover, use ofthe reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the 
respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is 
critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of 
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. 
Id. at 363, 364. 
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Perhaps the "high-water mark" with respect to the principle 
is the well-known case of MuLLaney v. Wilbur. 38 There, the 
defendant was charged with murder but evidence was offered to 
indicate voluntary manslaughter based on the proposition that 
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Maine 
required that the government prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the intentional killing but that the defendant was re-
quired to prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that 
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Because 
the factor of heat of passion was actually an element of the 
crime (voluntary manslaughter was defined as a killing done in 
the heat of passion), the Court concluded that the state had 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof, as to this element, to 
the defendant. Under Winship, according to the majority, the 
result was impermissible because "the Due Process Clause 
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the absence of the heat of passion .... "39 
The Court was never again to go as far as it did in Mullaney 
v. Wilbur , a case that, admittedly, involved an unusual fact 
pattern where an apparent "defense" was actually an element 
of the crime. For instance, in Patterson v. New York,40 state law 
required that the defendant in a prosecution for second-degree 
murder prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she 
acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance in 
order to reduce the crime to manslaughter. The Court in Patter-
son distinguished the Mullaney holding, finding that the factor at 
issue in New York was not an element of the offense as it had 
been in Maine. 41 
In a number of recent entrapment cases, defense counsel 
has relied on this line of constitutional determination by the 
Court, arguing that a showing of inducement and predisposition 
went to the heart of the case against the defendant. Thus the 
burden, under the due process clause, should be on the gov-
ernment to prove "non-entrapment." These contentions have 
been systematically rejected. The court in United States v. 
38 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
39 [d. at 704. 
40 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
41 [d. at 214-216. 
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Braver42 noted that the defense of entrapment simply "does not 
negate any of the essential elements of the crime. "43 That is, 
under the traditional views of the entrapment defense, the de-
fense is allowed as a matter of policy either because of legisla-
tive intent44 or because certain inducement activities on the part 
of the government are inherently unacceptable. 45 In neither 
situation, however, does the entrapment claim go to disproving 
any of the essential elements of the crime.46 As stated by one 
recent New York court: 
Nor contrary to defendant's contention, is there any constitutional 
infirmity in imposing the burden of proving entrapment by a preponder-
ance of the evidence upon the defendant as an affirmative defense. 
Establishment of an entrapment defense does not negate the commission 
of the crime charged or the existence of any element thereof. Rather this 
affirmative defense' ' is designed to prevent punishment for an offense 
which" is the product of the creative activity of [the state's] own 
officials "by focusing on the inducing conduct of the police and the 
defendant's predisposition. "47 
While there may be some confusion as to the defense burden 
under the subjective test, as indicated above, there is no confu-
sion at all as to the government's burden. In both the federal 
courts48 and the state courts,4'J if the defendant satisfies the first 
42 450 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1971). 
43 [d. at 803. 
44 See, e .g., Chief Justice Hughes' view in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 
435, 448 (1932). 
45 The leading statement of this position is probably Justice Frankfurter' s in the 
Sherman case, 356 U.S. at 380. See also Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457. 
46 Indeed, in some jurisdictions the defendant wiJI have to admit the commission 
of the offense in order to raise the entrapment defense. See tex.t accompanying note 
168 infra . 
47 New York v. Millard, 456 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203-204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). See 
also Washington v. Ziegler, 575 P.2d 723, 725 (Wash. 1978), where the court-after 
affirming the propriety of placing the burden of proof as to an affirmative defense on 
the defendant-also noted that Mullaney only dealt with the situation in which the 
court was "to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant and negate facts which 
the State is required by statute to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. " 
48 See, e.g., United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903. 915 (D.C. CiT. 1978); United 
States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 856 (5th Cif. 1985); United State s v. Hill, 62 F.2d 
1301, 1304 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Humphrey, 670 F.2d 153, 155-156 (11th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied. 456 U.S. 1010. 
49 See, e .g., Watkins v. Georgia, 318 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 1985); Maine v. Jones, 388 
A.2d 69, 71 (Me. 1978); Florida v. Wheeler, 468 So. 2d 979, 981 (Fla. 1985). 
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prong of the Hand test, "the burden then shifts to the prosecu-
tion to prove the defendant's predisposition beyond a reason-
able doubt. At that stage, the focus shifts to a subjective inquiry 
about the particular defendant's state of mind. "50 
As stated by the court in Simmons v. Maryland,51 "the bur-
den as to the second question-was the defendant's criminal 
conduct due to his own readiness and not to the persuasion of 
the police, that is, did he have a predisposition to commit the 
offense-is on the State. This must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
The Objective Approach 
In a minority of jurisdictions, the "objective" approach to 
entrapment is followed, as espoused by both the Model Penal 
Code52 and the proposed revised Federal Criminal Code of the 
initial Brown Commission. 53 Since the objective approach fo-
cuses not on the defendant's attitude or state of mind but rather 
on the government's conduct, there is, at least ideally, no issue 
regarding the defendant's predisposition. Thus, under both the 
Model Penal Code and the proposed Federal Criminal Code, 
entrapment is viewed as an "affirmative defense," which must 
be shown by the defendant. In the comments to both these 
proposed codes, the rationale given for placing the burden on 
the defendant is that this defense does not deal with defeating an 
element of the crime but instead is founded on public policy. As 
noted by the minority in the Sorrells case, the entrapment 
defense is based on "public policy which protects the purity of 
government and its processes. "54 Those courts that have 
adopted the objective approach have done so either because of 
specific statutory enactments or because of judicial decisions. A 
brief look at these two aspects of the approach is worthwhile. 
One of the leading state cases dealing with the statutory 
adoption of the objective standard is North Dakota v. Pfister. 55 
50 United States v. Kelly , 748 F.2d 691, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
5 1 259 A.2d 814, 820 (Md. 1969). 
52 Model Penal Code § 2.13(2). 
53 Brown Commission Report §§ 702(1) , 103. 
S4 287 U.S. at 455. 
55 264 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1978). 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court there analyzed the North 
Dakota statute which is identical to thtf language of the original 
proposed Federal Criminal Code. The court noted that the final 
report of the Commission on the Federal Code asserted that the 
entrapment defense "is treated primarily as a curb upon im-
proper law enforcement techniques, to which the predisposition 
of the particular defendant is irrelevant. "56 As a consequence , 
the court found that the burden should be placed on the defen-
dant, and the North Dakota legislature expressly did so by 
stating that it was "an affirmative defense that the defendant 
was entrapped into committing the offense. "57 The court also 
pointed to the legislature's determination that "an affirmative 
defense must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of 
evidence. "58 
The case of Michigan v. D'Angelo59 is an excellent treat-
ment of the adoption of the objective standard by judicial de-
termination rather than statutory enactment. There, the court 
looked to the rationale for the various entrapment standards and 
determined that the objective standard was the better approach. 
As a consequence, it held that the defendant should have the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she 
was entrapped. The court stated that this was appropriate be-
cause' ' the defense of entrapment is not interjected to establish 
the absence of an essential element of the crime but to present 
facts collateral or incidental to the criminal act which justify 
acquittal on the ground of an overriding public policy to deter 
instigation of crime by enforcement officers in order to get a 
conviction. "60 Once again, in response to the popular argument 
that burdening the defendant with proving the defense of en-
trapment raises constitutional questions, the court simply de-
56/d. at 697. 
57Id. at 699; see also N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-11. 
58 N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-01-03. For a similar commentary on an entrapment 
statute, see Hawaii v. Anderson, 572 P.2d 159 (Hawaii 1977). There are a number of 
statutes dealing with the objective standard and requiring the defendant to shoulder 
the burden by preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-209 
(1947); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 702-237 (1976); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-11 (1985); Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 313. 
59 257 N.W.2d 655 (Mich. 1977). 
60 [d. at 661. 
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cided that the issue did not involve elements of the offense and 
hence the due process clause was satisfied.61 
Questions of Law and Fact 
The burden of proof problem, as discussed previously, be-
comes particularly acute when it focuses on the individual(s) 
who must be satisfied by the offer of proof. In the entrapment 
area, courts often loosely talk about entrapment existing as a 
matter of law or a matter of fact. Indeed, some courts have even 
suggested that entrapment as a matter of law can be disposed of 
not by the court, but by the trier of fact, the jury. Generally, 
however, questions of law and fact in the entrapment area 
typically are resolved by looking to whether the jurisdiction 
employs the subjective test or the objective test. The major 
exception to this principle falls in those cases that would nor-
mally have the matter resolved by the jury, but the court con-
cludes that entrapment has been shown so clearly that it can be 
determined as a matter of law. 
The Subjective Test 
The subjective test as enunciated by the Supreme Court has 
always been assumed, by the Court, to be typically resolved by 
having entrapment viewed as a question of fact to be considered 
by the jury. 62 The reason for this jury determination typically 63 
is that " the issue of whether a defendant has been entrapped is 
for the jury as part of its function of determining the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. "64 Although the burden can constitu-
tionally be placed on the defendant-because the factors in-
volved in entrapment do not affect the elements of the offense 
itselpS-the guilt or innocence consideration is foremost in the 
61 1d. at 662. See also Pfister, 264 N.W.2d at 694; Anderson, 572 P.2d at 159. 
62 The cases, of course, are: Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); 
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 
423 (1973). 
63 Though the matter is not always for the jury, as in the Sherman case itself 
where the Court concluded that the issue should be decided as a matter of law. 356 
U.S. at 377. 
64 1d. 
65 The constitutional question typically involves analysis of the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur and New York v. Patterson. concerning shifting the 
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subjective test jurisdiction. "The fundamental rationale of the 
entrapment defense, as established by the Supreme Court, is 
that a defendant charged with a criminal offense is not guilty if 
the criminal intent was implanted in him by the government. ' '66 
This rationale is followed in most states that follow the 
subjective approach; they generally submit the entrapment 
issue to the juryY The federal cases, of course, consistently 
follow the Supreme Court's view in concluding that "the ques-
tion of entrapment goes to his guilt or innocence of the offense 
charged and is to be resolved by the jury. "68 
An unusual procedure with respect to questions of law and 
fact in the entrapment area was developed by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Minnesota v. GrilUe. 69 The court analyzed the 
law of entrapment and concluded that it would retain the ma-
jority-subjective approach. 
In the majority view, the inquiry on entrapment is concerned primarily 
with the element of defendant's predisposition: whether it was his own 
original intent to commit the crime charged. The defense must show that 
the actions of the police went further than those necessary to produce 
evidence of the defendant's criminality. 70 
burden of proof as to proof of the elements of the offense. See text accompanying 
notes 37-47 supra. 
66 United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 , 208 (5th Cir. 1984). 
67 See, e.g., Illinois v. Johnson , 462 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. 1984); Oregon v. McBride, 
589 P.2d 1164 (Or. 1979), rev'd on other grounds , 599 P.2d 449 ; Hefner v. Oklahoma, 
542 P.2d 527 (Okla. 1975); Ohio v. Hsie, 303 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio 1973); Arizona v. 
Boccelli, 467 P.2d 740 (Ariz. 1970). 
68 Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1%9); see also United States 
v. Lentz, 624 F.2d 1280, 1286 (5th Cir. 1980) ("it is well settled that the question of 
entrapment, if fairly raised, is one for the jury. "); United States v. Mayo , 705 F.2d 
62, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1983) ("jury determinations of this issue are favored"); See 
generally United States v. Rogers, 639 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). 
69 230 N.W.2d 445 (Minn. 1975). 
70 Jd. at 452. The court went on to explain why it was retaining the subjective test. 
[W)e decline to adopt the [objective] approach suggested by defendant. To 
determine entrapment we must distinguish between the " trap for the unwary 
innocent and trap for the unwary criminal." If the latter is the target, there is no 
entrapment. Where, as here, we have situations involving drug pushers, the 
practicalities and realities are such that convictions would be almost nonexistent 
if the "objective" theory of entrapment were adopted. If the evidence adduced by 
the prosecution is accepted, then it becomes clear that the defendant was no 
unwary innocent person. 
[d. at 454. 
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The court recognized that the entrapment issue has tradi-
tionally been given to the jury for consideration after instruc-
tions from the court based on this subjective approach.7l While 
the court continued to allow the defendant to elect to have this 
defense decided by the jury, it also offered future defendants an 
option. In its view, "entrapment should no longer be left in all 
instances as a defense to be determined by the jury. .. [so] 
that a proper balance may be struck between the obligations of 
law enforcement and the rights of the accused who raises the 
defense of entrapment. "72 
According to Minnesota v. Griffie, therefore, the defendant 
can either have the matter resolved by the jury or can, prior to 
the commencement of trial, elect to have the claim of entrap-
ment heard and decided by the court as a matter of law. After 
giving notice of this election to the court and the prosecution 
and setting forth the basis for the claim, the defendant can 
present the argument at a pretrial evidentiary hearing similar to 
a motion to suppress evidence. The trial judge then makes 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. 
If the court decides that defendant was entrapped into the commission of 
the crime charged, this will be a bar to further prosecution for that 
charge. The state may appeal this decision. If the court holds that there 
was no entrapment, the issue is closed and defendant may not present 
the defense to the jury. 13 
The Minnesota approach is an unusual one, giving the de-
fendant an option in determinations of questions of law and fact. 
No empirical evidence has been offered to indicate how often 
the process is utilized and whether a significant number of 
defendants elect to have a court determination instead of the 
more usual jury decision. The decision has not, however, been 
broadly followed throughout the United States. In the vast 
majority of states, the defendant is given no option concerning 
these questions. 
In determining whether the entrapment issue gets to the jury 
in jurisdictions that utilize the subjective approach, the trial 
judge normally must view the evidence on the two separate 
questions: inducement by the government, and predisposition 
71 ld. at 455 . 
72 ld. 
73 1d. 
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of the defendant. If, of course, the defendant offers no evidence 
of inducement, the entrapment defense will not come before the 
jury. Thus, as indicated above, in most jurisdictions simply 
demonstrating that an opportunity was created by the govern-
ment for the commission of the crime will be insufficient to 
satisfy the burden as to inducement. 74 The defendant, however, 
rarely loses on this point. As noted by the Second Circuit , the 
"defendant bears a 'relatively slight' burden in showing in-
ducement. He need demonstrate only that the government ini-
tiated the crime. "75 The Ninth Circuit characterization was 
similar. It referred to the fact that "only slight evidence is 
needed to create a factual issue and get the defense to the 
jury. "76 
A few recent cases will demonstrate the ease with which the 
defendant normally will sustain his burden. See, for instance , 
United States v. Knight 77 where the defendant was charged with 
possession of a " sawed-off shotgun. "78 Defendant claimed that 
he had been entrapped into selling the sawed-off shotgun. On 
the matter of inducement, the court had little difficulty deter-
mining that sufficient evidence had been offered. 
The defendant's testimony lwas1 that he offered to sell the weapon in 
un sawed-off state , but that the government agent indicated on both the 
first and second contact with the Defendant , that he would buy the 
weapon only if it were sawed-off; the Defendant finally agreeing on the 
second contact , after having first refused the agent's request to saw off 
the barrel of the weapon, because he needed the money . 79 
Gobin v. Texas 80 presents another interesting view of the 
amount of evidence necessary to demonstrate inducement. 
The defendant there was convicted of delivering amphetamines. 
The contention for the defense was entrapment. The only evi-
dence offered to demonstrate inducement which the court con-
74 See text accompanying notes 27-35 supra . 
75 United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1983). 
76 United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982). 
77 604 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
78 In violation of 26 U .S.C. §§ 586I(d), 5861(e), 5871. 
79 604 F. Supp. at 986. 
80 684 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1985). 
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sidered81 was the government agent's threat to withhold rent 
money if the defendant did not sell the amphetamines to another 
individual, an undercover officer. The court concluded that this 
threat, while "far from conclusive evidence, "82 was sufficient 
proof of entrapment to raise the issue. 
If there is a difficulty with the showing of inducement, it is 
almost always because of a court's reliance on the "unitary" 
approach to the entrapment determination. That is, in a few 
jurisdictions it is not enough for the defendant simply to demon-
strate governmental inducement. 83 Instead-assuming the gov-
ernment has satisfied its burden-the defendant must offer 
some "evidence negating the defendant's propensity to commit 
the crime. "84 As the court in United States v. Mayo noted: 
While jury determinations of this issue are favored , the defendant is not 
automatically entitled to have the defense go to the jury whenever 
inducement is shown. If the government' s evidence of propensity stands 
uncontradicted , there is no factual issue for the jury to resolve and the 
defense will not be submitted. 85 
It is also true, however, that very little is needed even to 
raise some doubt as to the predisposition, for the trial court 
must examine the record ofthe case "in the light most favorable 
to the defendant. "86 In addition, "any evidence negating pro-
pensity, whether in cross-examination or otherwise, requires 
submission to the jury however unreasonable the judge would 
consider a verdict in favor of defendant to be.' '87 
81 The defendant also argued that the government agent threatened to withhold 
drugs that the defendant needed for his own addiction unless he would sell drugs to 
the undercover officer. The court, relying on prior precedent. held that such threats 
to withhold drugs could not constitute evidence that would raise the issue of entrap-
ment . 
A promise to get a person high on dope is so unlikely to induce a person not 
already so disposed, to commit the criminal offense charged as to not even raise 
the issue of entrapment. 
[d. at 804-805 (citing Bush v. Texas, 611 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex. 1980». 
82 The court asked the obvious question, "[why] didn't the appellant simply tell 
the informant to sell his own drugs to his own friend?" 684 S.W.2d at 805. 
8J See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra. 
84 United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 509 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 597 (3d Cir. 1982). 
85 705 F.2d 62, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1983). 
86 United States v. Anglada, 524 F.2d 296, 298 (2d Cir. 1975). 
87 United States v. Riley , 363 F.2d 955,959 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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Cases do arise, though, where the defendant may be able to 
demonstrate some government initiation, but may not be able to 
show any negative evidence as to his preexisting intent to com-
mit the crime. See, for example, United States v. Armocida88 
where the defendant was convicted of various drug offenses. 89 
The court conceded that the facts arguably showed that gov-
ernment agents initiated the crime, but concluded "there was 
no evidence negating any propensity on the part of [the defen-
dant] to deal in narcotics.' '90 All the evidence in the case indi-
cated the defendant was" a knowing and willing participant in 
the transactions from the start. "91 In all conversations the 
defendant readily replied that he would be able to obtain nar-
cotics, that deadlines could be met, and that further meetings 
with the government agents would solve any difficulties as to 
the sale of the drugs. While there were numerous delays in 
connection with the sale of drugs, the evidence indicated the 
delays were "not due to any reluctance on [defendant's] part." 
The defendant in that case did not take the stand but still •• could 
have presented evidence negating propensity either through his 
own testimony, by cross-examining government witnesses or 
by any other means, but he failed to do so. "92 
The Second Circuit set forth the "minimal" rule under the 
unitary approach for preserving the defense. 
[T Jo contradict the government's evidence of propensity , defendant 
must offer some evidence that is on target, some evidence that raises an 
issue of fact, however slight, concerning his propensity to commit the 
crime. A shot in the dark will not do. We will not . .. require submission 
of the defense despite overwhelming uncontradicted evidence of predis-
postition. While the accused need not meet the government's showing 
with evidence of equal quantity and quality, he must at a minimum 
address the government's showing.1J3 
88 515 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1975). 
89 Conspiring to distribute, distributing, and using a telephone to facilitate dis-
tribution of heroin. 
90 515 F.2d at 55 . 
91 [d. at 56. The facts here are to be contrasted with those in United States v. 
Anglada, 524 F.2d 296, 297 (2d eir. 1975), where predisposition was established in 
the government officer's testimony of the defendant's ready response to the induce-
ment. There, however, the defense was preserved because the defendant cast doubt 
on the credibility of the agent; he "offered a different version of the transaction." 
92 515 F.2d at 56. 
93 United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62. 70 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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The entrapment issues properly raised in a criminal trial are 
particularly appropriate for jury consideration because so often 
the issue of predisposition is one of credibility. In essence , 
many entrapment cases are disputes concerning who to believe, 
the defendant or the government agent. Because the jury is 
traditionally seen as the best judge of credibility, jurors properly 
are given the determination concerning the question of predis-
position in most courtS.94 The trial court in United States v. 
Lentz gave a fairly standard instruction dealing with this issue. 
Where a person has no previous intent or purpose to violate the law, but 
is induced or persuaded by law enforcement officers or their agents to 
commit a crime, he is a victim of entrapment , and the law of matter of 
policy forbids his conviction in such a case . 
On the other hand , where a person already has the readiness and will-
ingness to break the law, the mere fact that government agents provide 
what appears to be a favorable opportunity is not entrapment. 
If, then, the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evi-
dence in the case that, before anything at all occurred regarding the 
offenses charged in the indictment, the defendants ... were ready and 
willing to commit the crime as charged in the indictment , whenever the 
opportunity was afforded , and that law enforcement officers or their 
agents did no more than offer the opportunity, then the jury should find 
that the defendants . .. are not victims of entrapment. 
On the other hand , if the evidence in the case should leave you with a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendants had the previous intent or 
purpose to commit the offense as charged, apart from the inducement or 
persuasion of some law enforcement officers or agent of the government, 
then it is your duty to find the defendants . . . not guilty. 95 
Ultimately, as is readily apparent, "the key to an entrap-
ment defense is the accused's predisposition to commit the 
crime. "96 There will be cases , however, in which the trial court 
cannot allow the entrapment issue to go before the jury because 
a finding in favor of the defendant must be made as a matter of 
law. 
In jurisdictions that utilize the subjective test , if there is 
sufficient evidence to get to the jury, when the defendant raises 
94 See generally United States v. Rogers, 639 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Lentz, 624 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 
(3d Cif. 1978). 
93 624 F.2d at 1286-1287 & n.8. 
96/d. at 1286. 
217 
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
the entrapment defense, the judge can nevertheless decide the 
matter as a question oflaw. This decision oflaw normally arises 
in one of two contexts: the evidence is indisputable with respect 
to a lack of predisposition, or the government conduct is so 
extreme as to require a verdict on the entrapment issue for the 
defendant. Because the issues are so very different under these 
two approaches, they will be treated separately. 
Indisputable Evidence of Lack of Predisposition 
Two recent cases have set forth the standard for a decision 
of law on behalf of the defendant. The Ninth Circuit in United 
States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen 97 made clear that such a decision 
required uncontested evidence as to lack of predisposition. "In 
order to show that entrapment exists as a matter of law, there 
must be undisputed testimony making it patently clear that an 
otherwise innocent person was induced to commit the act com-
plained of by trickery, persuasion, or fraud of a government 
agent. "98 
The state approach is illustrated by a recent opinion of the 
Arizona Court of Appeals: "Entrapment is a question for the 
jury unless there is no evidence to support the defense or unless 
97 754 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1985). 
981d. at 821. See also United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. 
den.ied, 429 U.S. 854; United States v. Abushi, 682 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982). In some 
recent cases from the Eleventh Circuit, mention has been made, in dicta, "that the 
doctrine of entrapment as a matter of law did not survive the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Hampton v. United States . ... " United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 
1491, 1499 (lith Cir. 1985). The difficulty with this statement is that it simply is not a 
correct construction of the law. The statement in Andrews relies on a similar state-
ment in United States v. Struuf, 701 F.2d 875, 877 n.6 (11th Cir. 1983), which in tum 
relies on a footnote in United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1240 n.5 (5th Cir. 
1978). The court in RodriRuez, however, was much more careful in its characteriza-
tion of the Supreme Court's holding in Hampton: 
In Bueno, this court held that entrapment is established as a matter of law 
whenever the contraband in question is supplied to the defendant by a govern-
ment agent, even where the defendant is predisposed. Bileno was effectively 
overruled by Hampton v. United Stales. 
Thus, the Rodriguez court merely noted that the supply of drugs as such would not 
constitute entrapment as a matter oflaw, not that the entire doctrine of entrapment as 
a matter of law was no longer valid. The correct view of the principle was stated by 
the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1985): 
In essence, the jury must find that the defendant's culpable intent originated with 
the defendant and was not the result of acts of government agents. Thus, to 
declare entrapment as a matter of law requires the conclusion that a reasonable 
jury could not find that the government discharged its burden of proof. 
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uncontradicted testimony makes it clear that an otherwise inno-
cent person has been induced to commit criminal acts. "9'J 
The defense motion with respect to entrapment as a matter 
of law can only be resolved by a thorough and careful review of 
the evidence concerning inducement, the degree of pressure 
utilized, and predisposition. The process is a difficult but im-
portant one. 
Defense Motion Granted 
In United States v. McLernon, 100 the defendants were con-
victed of conspiracy in connection with cocaine sales. One 
defendant contended that the evidence as to lack of predisposi-
tion was beyond dispute. The court began by noting that the 
issue of entrapment normally is properly submitted to the jury . 
.. If, [however,] the facts pertaining to that issue are not in real 
dispute, the question of entrapment may be taken from the jury 
[and decided 'as a matter of law']. "101 
In order for the entrapment case to reach the jury, the 
government must present evidence from which the jurors could 
decide that the defendant was predisposed to break the law 
prior to the time that he received the opportunity given by the 
government officers. 102 The court stated that in determining the 
question as a matter of law it would have to view the evidence 
"in the light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in its favor." 103 The question 
then becomes whether any reasonable juror could conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed 
99 State v. Gessler, 690 P.2d 98, 101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). 
100 746 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1984). 
IO I Id. at 1111. 
I02Id. (citing, among other cases , United States v. Hodge, 539 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091; United States v. Jones, 575 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 
1978); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973». The court also 
referred to the Sherman case where the Supreme Court concluded that the govern-
ment's predisposition evidence had not been sufficient and that entrapment could be 
determined as a matter of law. Another construction of the Sherman case is also 
possible, fOCUSing on the outrageous behavior of the government officers. See text 
accompanying notes 123-126 infra. 
103 746 F.2d at III J. 
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to commit the crime. In relying on cases from other courts,104 
the court stated that the key question is whether the defendant 
was predisposed to commit the crime "before coming into con-
tact with the government." lOS 
[The factors relevant to determining a defendant's prior disposition 
include] the character or reputation of the defendant, including any prior 
criminal record; whether the suggestion of the criminal activity was 
initially made by the Government; whether the defendant was engaged 
in the criminal activity for profit; whether the defendant evidenced 
reluctance to commit the offense, overcome only by repeated Govern-
ment inducement or persuasion; and the nature of the inducement or 
persuasion supplied by the Government. 106 
In the McLernon case, the government presented no evi-
dence of the character or reputation of the defendant, no show-
ing of a prior criminal record, and the evidence demonstrated 
quite clearly that the government officer initiated the contact. 
The defendant was resistant at first and then an unrelated 
profit-motivating "inducement" was created by the government 
agent, finally persuading the defendant to go along with the 
criminal activity.107 It was only after repeated personal contacts 
that the defendant, a "hard working" delivery man who had 
volunteered his time in numerous public activities, committed 
the crime. The court concluded that the defendant was en-
trapped as a matter of law. 
On the record before us , we find no evidence that (defendant's] charac-
ter or reputation inclined him toward criminal activity , no evidence that 
[heJ initiated the criminal activity, no evidence that [he] readily accepted 
the opportunity presented by [the] government agent , and no evidence 
104 See , e.g. , United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Reynoso-Ul1oa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th CiT. 1977), cert. denied. 436 U.S. 926. 
lOS 746 F.2d at 1112; see also United States v. Townsend, 555 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 
1977), cerl. denied. 434 U.S. 897. 
106 [d. 
107 The Court was particularly troubled by the government officer's establishment 
of an extremely close relationship with the defendant so as to later use that relation-
ship to exert influence in causing the criminal behavior. 
Yaqui and Hamlin became so close that they performed the Indian ritual of 
becoming " blood brothers .... " Agent Hamlin and Yaqui frequently called each 
other "blood brother." Hamlin, in fact, introduced Yaqui to his family by stating, 
"here's my blood brother; he's going to be one of the family ; treat him just like 
the family. " 
746 F.2d at 1113. 
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that [he) would have committed this crime absent the overwhelming 
strength of [the] agent ' s inducement. We find instead that [thej agent 
induced an unwary and innocent man into committing crimes he was not 
predisposed to commit by becoming his " blood brother" and preying 
upon the love and loyalty ofthat special relationship .... [W]e conclude 
that the government presented no evidence from which a reasonable 
juror could have concluded that [defendant] was predisposed to conspire 
to violate the narcotics laws. 108 
The defendants in United States v. Dion 109 were Indians 
living in one of the poorest parts of the United States with an 
extremely high unemployment rate and a very low annual in-
come. They were convicted of selling government agents such 
protected birds as eagles. The government offered no evidence 
that one of the defendants, Fool BuB, was predisposed to com-
mit the crime other than the fact that the government made an 
offer to purchase a bird from the defendant and that he accepted 
the offer with little hesitation. The defense, however, pointed to 
the fact that the government's undercover operation continued 
in this impoverished area for over two years and involved 
government agents on numerous occasions making extremely 
profitable offers of illicit activity to very poor residents of the 
area. Moreover, the defendant had but one transaction with the 
government and "the tape of this transaction reflects that Fool 
Bull had never sold a protected bird before and was quite naive 
as to the proper price for an eagle and what the 'traders ' would 
do with it." 110 The court recognized that the entrapment de-
fense is "relatively limited" and does not give the federal 
judiciary a " chancellor's foot" veto over disagreeable law en-
forcement practices. IliOn the nature of the evidence, however, 
it expressed real concern over whether the defendant's "actions 
I08Id. at 1114. 
109 762 F.2d 674 (8th eir. 1985). 
IIOld. at 691. 
II lId. (quoting Justice Rehnquist's opinion in the Russell case, 411 U.S. at 435). 
The court went on, however, to quote an earlier decision. 
[T]he line must be drawn where, as here, a government agent lures the unwary 
innocent and then implants a law-breaking disposition that was not theretofor 
present. In such cases the government takes on the unwholesome appearance of 
the consummate manufacturer of crime. The continuing vitality and integrity of 
our" government of laws" would be imperiled if we sanctioned the manufacturing 
of crime by those responsible for upholding and enforcing the law. 
762 F.2d at 691. 
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were completely the result of a government undercover opera-
tion which had carried on too long." Ultimately , the court held 
that "the evidence shows that Fool Bull was entrapped as a 
matter of law. No reasonable juror could have found beyond 
reasonable doubt that Fool Bull was ready and wil1ing to com-
mit the crimes, and that the agents did no more than afford him 
an opportunity to do SO." 112 
Defense Motion Denied 
Perhaps the leading case in this area-and one of the leading 
cases on the entire law of entrapment-is United States v. 
Jannotti. 11 3 There, the Third Circuit, en banc, considered one of 
the actions resulting from the government operation known as 
ABSCAM where FBI agents posed as employees of a fictional 
corporation and created opportunities "for illicit conduct by 
public officials predisposed to political corruption. " 11 4 The 
particular defendants involved in the case were found guilty of 
conspiring to obstruct interstate commerce llS and conspiring to 
violate the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization stat-
ute. 116 The two defendants were members of the Philadelphia 
City Council and were shown to have taken this "sting" money 
in exchange for promises of exerting influence on behalf of the 
givers of the money. One of the principal issues on appeal was 
the defense's entrapment argument. The district court had sub-
mitted the issue of entrapment to the jury following the usual 
jury instructions dealing with the subjective approach. After the 
jury decided that the defendants had not been entrapped , the 
district court nevertheless granted the defendant's motion for 
acquittal, finding that the evidence was, "as a matter of law, 
insufficient to establish the defendants ' predisposition beyond a 
reasonable doubt. " 11 7 
The basic question in Jannotti was whether the government 
may show predisposition simply by the acceptance of the 
112 Id. at 692. 
113 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert. denied. 457 U.S. 406. 
114 Jd. at 581. 
113 18 U .S.C. § 1951(a). 
116 R.Le.O. Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1 962(d). 
117 Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 598. 
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money itself, a proposition denied by the trial judge. By focus-
ing on several factors, the appeals court concluded that the 
government had proved precisely this, beyond a reasonble 
doubt. The court determined that the sizes of the payments 
($30,000 to one defendant and $10,000 to another) were not so 
large .. in today' s inflationary times . .. as to overcome an 
official's natural reluctance to accept a bribe." 118 Thus, these 
figures were not so high as to weigh against predisposition in 
favor of entrapment. Moreover, the two defendants, both pu blic 
officials , clearly knew that the payments were bribes to be used 
in exchange for exerting improper influence on the rest of the 
Philadelphia council. As a consequence, the majority deter-
mined that the defense could not prevail as a matter of law. 
The ultimate factual decisions in an entrapment case must be left to the 
jury. Where , as here, the jury was uniquely equipped to inquire into the 
calculus of human interaction, the court should not interfere with its 
conclusions, We conclude that in determining that the defendants were 
entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the ground of entrapment as a 
matter of law the district court impermissibly substituted its own deter-
mination of the credibility of witnesses , the weight of the evidence and 
the inferences to be drawn from the evidence for that of the jury.1 19 
Extreme Government Conduct 
This branch of the legal question is quite different from the 
usual entrapment claimed resolved as a matter oflaw. It is often 
linked closely to the due process concerns discussed else-
1181d. at 599. 
119 [d. at 606. Judge Aldisert wrote a lengthy dissent challenging a number of the 
fundamental premises of the ml\iority. In particular, he questioned the deference to 
be given to the jurors as fact finders in entrapment cases. 
The ml\iority all allow the entrapment question in this case to be resolved by a lay 
jury. As staunchly as I believe the jury, reflecting the conscience of the commu-
nity , should be society 's instrument for resolving controverted facts once a 
minimum legal threshold has been established, I stoutly believe also that the jury, 
untrained in the law, should never be called upon to design and construct that 
threshold . . .. Defining the precise division of authority in the judge-jury rela-
tionship is always a sensitive and delicate responsibility. Where the defense of 
entrapment is interposed, however, responsibility is appreciably intensified. The 
mere submission to thejury may present the jury with a Hobson' s choice as to the 
defendant, because the entrapment defense requires the defendant to admit the 
commission of deeds which, but for their inducement by the government, would 
constitute the commission of a crime. 
Id. at 614; see generally United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1077-1078 (5th CiT. 
1985). 
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where. 120 For instance, the Eighth Circuit noted that where the 
government's conduct is so outrageous or fundamentally unfair 
the defendant may be deprived of due process of law, or the 
courts may be moved . 'in the exercise of their supervisory 
jurisdiction over the administration of criminal justice to hold 
that the defendant was · entrapped' as a matter of law." 121 The 
court in that case went on to note that such an entrapment 
argument involving outrageous government involvement simply 
presents no issue of fact for the jury to decide, it is entirely a 
question of law for the court. Because the legal question here is 
necessarily linked to the due process considerations, an 
extended discussion of the subject is not appropriate. 122 Still, 
it is important to note that there is much in the famous Sher-
man 123 case to provide a basis for a ruling of entrapment as a 
matter of law. 
The defendant in Sherman was convicted of the sale of 
narcotics. The government agent 124 first met him at a doctor's 
office where both were being treated for narcotics addiction. 
After numerous requests were denied for the purchase of nar-
cotics, the defendant finally succumbed to the request of the 
agent. Chief Justice Warren had little doubt that the defendant 
had been induced to commit the crime and that the evidence 
with respect to predisposition was marginal. 125 Thus, one read-
ing of the case is that the Court decided that the government 
simply had not shouldered its burden of proving predisposition 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, much ofthe language 
in the case appears to be connected to the due process, outra-
geous conduct argument discussed above. One of the most often 
quoted paragraphs from the case is right on point. 
120 See generally Park, note I supra. 
121 United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640, 648 (8th Cir. 1976); see generally United 
States v. McCaghren, 666 F.2d 1227, 1230 nn.5-7 (8th Cir. 1981). 
122 For an excellent discussion of this point, see Cruz v. Florida, 465 So. 2d 516, 
518-520 (Fla. 1985). 
123 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
124 The government agent was apparently operating as a "free agent" but the 
court made clear that the government could not "disown" him or "insist it is not 
responsible for his actions." [d. at 373. There were numerous instances of involve-
ment by the government official with this agent connecting the two together. 
125 The evidence of predisposition was weak. The defendant was reluctant and 
slow to respond to the agent's offers, and the only prior convictions in the area were a 
nine-year-old sales conviction and a five-year-old possession conviction. /d. at 375. 
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The case at bar illustrates an evil that the defense of entrapment is 
designed to overcome. The government informer entices someone at-
tempting to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal saJe but 
also into returning to the habit of use . Selecting the proper time , the 
informer then tells the government agent. The set-up is accepted by the 
agent without even a question as to the manner in which the informer 
encountered the seller. Thus, the Government plays on the weaknesses 
of an innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes which he 
otherwise would not have attempted. Law enforcement does not require 
methods such as this. 126 
The Objective Test 
The traditional view of the objective test for entrapment 
involves a judicial determination of the key questions. Most 
courts have taken this view based on the notion that the purpose 
of the doctrine of entrapment is not to determine the individ-
ual's culpability, but rather to apply public policy so as to 
preserve the purity of the judicial system. Justice Frankfurter, 
dissenting in the Sherman case, put the matter forcefully: 
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his 
conduct fall s outside the proscription of the statute , but because , even if 
his guilt be admitted , the methods employed on behalf ofthe government 
to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced .... Insofar as they 
are used as instrumentalities in the administration of criminal justice , the 
federal courts have an obligation to set their face against enforcement of 
the law by lawless means or means that violate rationally vindicated 
standards of justice, and refuse to sustain such method by effectuating 
them .. . . Public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of 
justice , upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is the transcend-
ing value at stake. 127 
Because of this idea of an entrapment defense linked to 
public policy and the preservation of the propriety of the judi-
cial system , the principal Supreme Court opinions espousing 
the objective view consistently declare that the courts , not the 
juries, should consider the entrapment issue. Justice Roberts in 
Sorrells: 
The doctrine rests , rather , on a fundamental rule of public policy. The 
protection of its own functions and the preservation of the purity of its 
own temple belongs only to the court. It is the province of the court and 
126 Id. at 376. 
m 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting). 
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of the court alone to protect itself and the government from such pros-
titution of the criminal law. The violation of the principles of justice by 
the entrapment of the unwary into crime should be dealt with by the 
court no matter by whom or at what stage of the proceedings the facts 
are brought to its attention. 128 
Justice Frankfurter in Sherman: 
[S]uch a judgment, aimed at blocking off areas of impermissible police 
conduct, is appropriate for the court and not for the jury .... [AJ jury 
verdict, although it may settle the issue of entrapment in the particular 
case, cannot give significant guidance for official conduct for the future . 
Only the court, through the gradual evolution of explicit standards in 
accumulated precedence, can do this with a degree of certainty that the 
wise administration of criminal justice demands. 129 
Justice Stewart dissenting in the Russell case: 
[T]he question is whether-regardless of the predisposition of the par-
ticular defendant involved---the government agents have acted in such a 
way as is likely to instigate or create a criminal offense . Under this 
approach, the determination of the lawfulness of the Government's 
conduct must be made-as it is on all questions involving the legality of 
law enforcement methods-by the trial judge, not the jury .130 
Several of the state courts that follow the objective standard 
also rely on the principle that the determinations are properly 
for the judge, not the jury. As stated by the Alaska Supreme 
Court in Grossman v. Alaska, 131 the issue is a question to be 
determined by the court and not the jury ... [I]t is obvious that 
the issue of entrapment can be litigated either before or during 
trial and should be determined by the court and not the jury. " 
Perhaps the leading state case advocating the judicial de-
termination of the entrapment question is Michigan v. D'An-
gelo. 132 There, the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed the view 
that the objective standard is based on the position that the 
court, not the jury, ought to consider the broad policy questions 
involved in an entrapment defense. This determination was said 
to transcend the particular guilt or innocence of the defen-
128 287 U.S. at 457. 
129 356 U.S. at 385. 
1)0 411 U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
131 457 P.2d 226, 230 (Alaska 1969). 
m 257 N.W.2d 655 (Mich. 1977). 
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dant. 133 The court went on, however, to point to the practical 
reason why the judge, not the jury, should consider the entrap-
ment issue.134 The court was concerned preliminarily with a 
lack of guidance given by jury verdicts: 
A jury verdict of guilty provides no evaluation of the challenged police 
conduct in the case and gives no guidance by which to measure the 
propriety offuture official conduct. Similarly, a verdict of not guilty fails 
to disclose whether the police conduct challenged in the case was found 
to be impermissible or that the prosecution simply failed to prove the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 135 
A judicial resolu tion, of course, may' ' through an accumula-
tion of cases, lprovide] a body of precedent which will stand as 
a point of reference both for law enforcement officials and the 
courts. "136 Ultimately, however, the court's chief concern was 
that ajury simply could not at the same time consider evidence 
establishing the guilt for a given crime and determine that en-
trapment occurred with respect to such evidence. 
1 n The policy considerations which moved us to adopt the objective test of 
entrapment compel with equal force the conclusion that the judge and not the jury 
must determine its existence. The thesis is that law enforcement conduct which 
essentially manufactures crime is a corruptive use of governmental authority 
which, when used to obtain a conviction, taints the judiciary which tolerates its 
use. It is a practice which relies for its success upon judicial indifference, if not 
approval, and it must be deterred. Its deterrence is a duty which transcends the 
determination of guilt or innocence in a given case and stands ultimately as the 
responsibility of an incorruptible judiciary. 
Id. al 658. 
134 Aside from the forceful policy considerations which dictate judicial vigilance 
in guarding against and precluding the use of improper law enforcement tactics in 
the judicial process, there are pragmatic reasons why the duty should not be 
passed along to the jury. 
Id . at 659. 
1351d. 
136 /d. ; but see Park, note I supru, at 226-227: 
(Sjupporters of the [objective] test usually advocate that the defense of entrap-
ment be tried before the judge instead of the jury, so that a set of detailed 
standards can develop as judges write opinions dealing with specific fact situa-
tions. 
Even with time and experience, development of detailed rules will probably prove 
to be quite difficult . . .. [ljt is . . . difficult to establish standardized procedures 
for the delicate process of investigation and detection. Officers and informers 
need to be able to respond differently to the multifarious situations with which 
they will be presented. 
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[E]vidence pertaining to guilt is likely to infect a jury determination of 
the voluntariness of a confession [and] has an equal and analogous 
application to jury determination of entrapment. 
Just as in the determination of the voluntariness of an alleged confes-
sion, determination by the trial court of the entrapment issue will insure 
that the jury' s verdict is free from the taint of undue and unnecessary 
prejudice which might well be generated by the concomitant duty to 
decide voluntariness in the confession case or the propriety of police 
conduct in the entrapment case. 137 
Given the chief rationale for the objective entrapment test as 
being one of public policy, it is not surprising that the minority 
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and a number of courts 
following this approach have determined that the matter is 
properly heard by the judge and not the jury,I38 Some states , 
however, that have adopted the objective test have decided that 
the entrapment question should be given to the jury and not to 
the judge. 139 In these courts, the judges focus on the objective 
test as evaluating the sort of conduct that might cause the 
average citizen to become a lawbreaker. With that in mind, the 
determination can properly be viewed as ajury matter. Perhaps 
the leading case on point is Iowa v. Mullen. 140 
It has been persuasively urged courts must strike down " the use of their 
process to consummate a wrong" [citing Justice Roberts opinion in 
137 D' Angelo, 257 N. W .2d at 659 (referring to the procedure for determining 
voluntariness of a confession stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 
378 U.S. 368 (1964)) . 
The jury, however, may find it difficult to understand the policy forbidding 
reliance upon a coerced, but true confession, a policy which has divided this 
Court in the past and an issue which may be reargued in the jury room. That a 
trustworthy confession must also be voluntary if it is to be used at all, generates 
natural and potent pressure to find it voluntary. Otherwise the guilty defendant 
goes free. Objective consideration of the conflicting evidence concerning the 
circumstances of the confession becomes difficult and the implicit findings be-
come suspect. 
378 U.S. at 382-383. 
138 The Model Penal Code position on this is clear because it refers to the burden 
being on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
conduct complained of occurred in response to entrapment. "The issue of entrap-
ment shall be tried by the Court in the absence of the jury. " Model Penal Code § 2.13 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). The position is the same in the proposed revised 
Federal Criminal Code, see text accompanying note 53 supra. 
139 Except, of course, in cases where the judge can resolve the matter as a 
question of law because the facts are so clear. 
140 216 N.W.2d 375 , 382 (Iowa 1974). 
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Sorrells, supra]. Others have observed the defense will frequently pose 
evidentiary conflicts peculiarly suited to jury determination. Certainly 
the jury can weigh conduct which might induce "a normally law abiding 
person" to commit a crime as surely as it can weigh (in a tort case) the 
required conduct of a "reasonably prudent person." 
The court noted that while there may be instances in which the 
trial judge should make the determination of entrapment as a 
matter of law,141 generally the issue will be submitted to the 
jury.142 
Inconsistent Defenses 
The traditional, and prevailing, view has been that a defen-
dant cannot raise inconsistent defenses in the entrapment area. 
Courts consistently hold that "it would be inconsistent and 
confusing to allow a defendant to contend in one breath that he 
did not commit the crime, and in the next breath that he was 
entrapped into committing it." 143 
A number of jurisdictions do not, however, accept this view. 
Moreover, even in those jurisdictions that do accept this view, 
there has been considerable confusion as to creating "excep-
tions" to the rule and also as to defining when it is that an 
inconsistent defense is raised. 144 This article turns first to the 
Jd. 
141 We hold the trial court shall determine the question as a matter oflaw where 
there is no dispute as to the facts or the inferences to be drawn from them but 
shall submit the issue to the jury where the defense is properly raised and there is 
a dispute in the evidence relating to the operative facts where the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom. 
142 For other states that utilize an objective test (typically based on the Model 
Penal Code) but give the basic question to the jury, see Hawaii v. Kelsey, 566 P.2d 
1370 (Hawaii 1970); California v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 956 n.6 (Cal. 1979); New 
Hampshire v. Bacon, 319 A.2d 636 (N.H. 1974). 
143 United States v. Sears, 343 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1965). 
144 The practical impact of the inconsistent defense rule is somewhat unclear. As 
pointed out by Professor Groot, in many cases: 
[T] he defendant would be ill-ad vised as a matter of tactics to deny that the act was 
done. To make that denial in the face of overwhelming proof simply destroys 
whatever credibility the defendant might have had when he gave his version of the 
entrapment facts. This is not to say that the present application of the inconsis-
tency rule to single-element crimes is legally supportable; it is merely to say that 
the class of cases in which it would be practical for the defendant to use both the 
defenses is so miniscule as to be unimportant. 
Groot, note 1 supra, at 254, 263. 
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rejection of the inconsistent defense, then to those courts that 
accept the principle, and finally to the situations in which the 
principle may not apply even in the majority of jurisdictions. 
It is not too surprising that courts that have adopted the 
objective test have been more likely to reject the inconsistent 
defense notion. 145 There are several explanations for this. First, 
this principle of allowing inconsistent defenses is in accord with 
the prevailing view in civil procedure l46 and the commonly 
accepted view in criminal cases as well. 147 More important, 
however, is the basic foundation for the objective defense. As 
noted by one court, the objective view has as its purpose a 
policy "to discourage untoward government involvement in the 
manufacture of crime; entrapment excuses the commission of 
acts that would otherwise constitute a crime. Thus, entrapment 
is a special defense addressed to the court, the function of 
which is akin to that of the exclusionary rule." 148 Because the 
basis of the objective principle is a focus on government con-
duct, the defendant's conduct becomes somewhat irrelevant. 
The Brown Commission made this point clearly. "The [defenseJ 
is designed to permit the defendant simultaneously to deny that 
he committed the offense and to claim an entrapment. The 
section, therefore, allows the defendant to plead inconsistent 
defenses."149 A broader explanation was given in perhaps the 
most famous opinion justifying the rejection of the inconsistent 
defense "doctrine." 
In California v. Perez, 150 Chief Justice Traynor rejected the 
government's position that in order to invoke the defense of 
entrapment the defendant would have to admit committing the 
criminal acts charged. In some detail, he explained his position. 
Although the defense is available to a defendant who is otherwise guilty, 
it does not follow that the defendant must admit guilt to establish the 
defense. A defendant, for example, may deny that he committed every 
145 Groot, note 1 supra, at 259. 
146 See generally C.A. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1283, at 368, 372. 
141 Groot, note 1 supra, at 259. 
148 United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981,983 n.l (9th Cir. 1975). 
149 Brown Commission, note 34 supra, working papers at 325. 
150 401 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1%5). 
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element of the crime charged, yet properly allege that such acts as he 
did commit were induced by law enforcement officers. Moreover, a 
defendant may properly contend that the evidence shows unlawful 
police conduct amounting to entrapment without conceding that it also 
shows his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When the evidence does 
show such conduct, the court has a duty to root its effects out of the trial 
upon its own initiative if necessary. Entrapment is recognized as a 
defense because "the court refuses to enable officers of the law to 
consummate illegal or unjust schemes designed to foster rather than 
prevent and detect crime." A rule designed to deter such unlawful 
conduct cannot properly be restricted by compelling a defendant to 
incriminate himself as a condition to invoking the rule. Thus, the defen-
dant may challenge the legality of a search and seizure without admitting 
that the property seized was taken from him and without asserting a 
proprietary interest in the premises entered. To compel a defendant to 
admit guilt as a condition to invoking the defense of entrapment would 
compel him to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt at the risk of not being able to meet his 
burden of proving entrapment. To put the defendant in that dilemma 
would frustrate the assertion of the defense itself and would thus under-
mine its policy,, 51 
The rejection of the inconsistency defense idea in objective 
test jurisdictions is not surprising. What is, however, somewhat 
more surprising is its rejection in some courts that follow the 
subjective test for entrapment. Perhaps the leading case on 
point is United States v. Demma. 152 There, the Ninth Circuit, en 
bane, considered the basic question, noting that the theory be-
hind it was that it is "factually inconsistent for defendant to 
deny the crime charged and, at the same time, to claim entrap-
ment."I SJ The court gave two reasons for its rejection of the 
inconsistent defense rule. The first was its view that such a rule 
conflicted with the Supreme Court's cases enforcing the en-
ISl/d. at 937-938. The CaJifomia Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in Califor-
nia v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947,956 (CaJ. 1979): "[A] defendant need not admit his guilt, 
or even commission of the act, to raise a defense of entrapment." The court went on 
inBarraza to make c1earthat the proper test of entrapment in CaJifomia would be the 
objective principle: "Was the conduct of the law enforcement agent likely to induce a 
normally law abiding citizen to commit the offense?" Id. at 955. 
15 2 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). 
I S) Id. at 982. The court cited its principaJ prior holding in the area which 
explained the previous rule. "Appellants, to say the least, take a very inconsistent 
position in this respect. Appellants have maintained throughout that they did not 
commit a crime. It logically follows that absent the commission of a crime there can 
be no entrapment. The triaJ court understood this situation and very properly refused 
to inject into the case a question which could have no other result than to confuse." 
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trapment doctrine. In particular, the court looked to the opinion 
in the Sorrells case. It found that the theory of the Supreme 
Court there was that "the acts necessary to constitute any 
federal crime must be non-entrapped acts; non-entrapment is an 
essential element of every federal crime which is put in issue 
whenever evidence is introduced suggesting that an unpredis-
posed defendant was induced by the government to commit the 
acts charged. "154 By requiring the defendant to concede the 
state of mind at issue, the court concluded, the government 
would be relieved of the burden of proving that the defendant 
had the mental element necessary under the statute. "[The in-
consistent defense rule] relieves the Government of this burden 
whenever the crime charged involves a mental element which 
the defendant refuses to concede. (Thus], relieving the Gov-
ernment of the burden of proving that the necessary acts were 
nonentrapped conflicts fundamentally with the Sorrells concep-
tion of entrapment. "ISS 
The court recognized that the government may not only 
have induced the acts required, but also the "scienter." More 
broadly, however, the court went on to find that there was no 
rationale for the inconsistent defense doctrine in entrapment 
cases where it would not be present in other cases. 
It is well established that a defendant in a criminal prosecution may 
assert inconsistent defenses. The rule in favor of inconsistent defenses 
reflects the belief of a modern criminal jurisprudence that a criminal 
defendant should be accorded every reasonable protection in defending 
himself against governmental prosecution. That established policy be-
speaks a healthy regard for circumscribing the Government's oppor-
tunities for invoking the criminal sanction. 
The [entrapment] inconsistency theory is an exception to the rule in 
favor of inconsistent defenses. But it is an exception without any jus-
tification. There is no conceivable reason for permitting a defendant to 
assert inconsistent defenses in other contexts but denying him that right 
in the context of entrapment. Indeed, there is a compelling reason for 
154 [d. at 983. The court went on to quote Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in 
Sorrells. which appeared to expressly reject the inconsistence defense notion. 
Id. 
The defense is available not in the view of the accused though guilty may go free , 
but that the government cannot be permitted to contend that he is guilty of a crime 
where the government officials are the instigators of his conduct. 
ISS /d. at 983-984. 
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not making an exception of the entrapment defense. The primary func~ 
tion of entrapment is to safeguard the integrity of the law enforcement 
and prosecution process. 156 
The most recent major case rejecting the inconsistent de-
fense principle is the Fifth Circuit's decision, en bane, in United 
States v. Henry. 157 There, the court focused on the "usual" 
inconsistent defense case. That is, the case in which the defen-
dant does not truly contest that certain acts were taken,ls8 but 
instead contends that the government never proved that he had 
the appropriate state of mind under the statute, wholly apart 
from any entrapment contention. The court concluded: 
[It would bel entirely consistent with the nature of the jury function and 
with the nature of the entrapment defense to require the jury to consider 
both the existence and the quality of the defendant's alleged intent. Nor 
do we believe that in the light of values thereby advanced that it is 
impermissibly inconsistent for an accused both to claim that his admitted 
acts were without criminal intent , but that nevertheless any act he so 
committed was induced by governmental entrapment. 1 S 9 
It focused its attention on the principle of entrapment being 
linked to the question of predisposition, "the origin of the 
criminal intent in issue. " 160 That issue would consistently be 
one for the jury . 'whether he was predisposed to commit the 
charged crime , i.e. , whether, focusing on the period before the 
commencement of the charged criminal episode, one can say 
that the criminal intent or design originated with government 
agents , is also a jury issue."161 
The court noted that entrapment asks one key question, 
"What was in the defendant's mind before he did the charged 
acts?" The other key question, however, in most cases, is what 
was in the defendant's mind at the time he committed the acts? 
It is , then, not too inconsistent for a defendant to testify that he did not 
have the criminal intent required for conviction and then, through his 
IS6 Id. at 985. 
15 7 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane). 
IS8 It would be the rare case , indeed, where the defendant would claim that he 
did not commit any of the acts alleged in the indictment. Such a case would normally 
involve misidentification, hardly the chief basis of most entrapment claim cases. 
159 749 F.2d at 211. 
160/d. at 213. 
16 1 [d. 
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lawyer's argument and the court's instruction on the law, to urge the 
jury, in the event it rejects his personal view concerning intent, to find 
that the evidence requires acquittal on the basis of the entrapment 
doctrine .. . . Our holding is rooted in the fact that criminal intent is a 
"subjective determination," an "issue for the jury to resolve on the 
basis of circumstantial evidence under the totality of the circum-
stances." ... [I]ntent necessarily has an amorphous and subjective qual-
ity that permits reasonable people , even the defendant and the jurors , 
fairly to disagree over whether his intent was criminal at the time the act 
was committed. Accordingly, it is not inconsistent with a criminal trial's 
"moral content and ... ultimate concern with guilt or innocence," to 
instruct the jury to evaluate the entrapment issue , should it disbelieve a 
defendant' s denial of criminal intent. 162 
The historical precedent of the inconsistency rule is not 
entirely clear. Probably, the earliest use occurred a century ago 
in People v. Murn 163 where the defendant was accused of selling 
whiskey to government officers. The court explicitly denied 
consideration of the entrapment defense-offered alternatively 
by the defendant. "Defendant is in no position to urge that the 
act complained of was induced by entrapment of the officers , 
for he claims he made no sale .... If it be found that he made 
the sale he cannot urge the defense of entrapment in exculpation 
of his act."164 
Another early case is Nutter v. United States. 165 There, the 
defendant not only denied that he provided morphine to a gov-
ernment informer, but also asserted the entrapment argument. 
The court did not hesitate to reject this view. 
Such contention ignores, not only his own testimony that all of Williams ' 
story was false , but the evidence of Williams that he bought drugs from 
162 Henry, 749 F.2d at 213-214. The dissenting judges focused primarily on the 
mlijority's view that the two defenses were not inconsistent. 
To have sustained that defense in Henry's case then , the jury would have been 
required, not only to disbelieve Henry's sworn testimony that he acted without 
the specific intent that forms the core and cruciaJ element of the offense with 
which he was charged, but to believe instead, not only that Henry acted with 
precisely the specific intent that he swore he did not harbor, but that the intent 
which he swore he did not have, originated with the government. In short, Henry 
claims the right to swear that he had no criminal intent and in the same breath to 
argue that he had one that did not originate with him. 
Id. at 214. 
163 190 N.W. 666 (1882). 
1641d. 
165 289 Fed. 484 (1923). 
234 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES OF ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 
the defendant a hundred times before. Under such circumstances there 
was nothing of illegitimate entrapment or procurement in the govern-
ment inspector' s sending him to make the 101st purchase under condi-
tions which would enable the United States to offer corroborative proof 
that the sale had been made. 166 
The majority of cases consistently takes the view that if the 
defendent has denied the commission of the acts constituting 
the crime, he cannot raise the entrapment defense. 167 One re-
cent case made the point forcefully. 
[0 Jne may not claim he was entrapped into a criminal act without first 
admitting that , he did, in fact commit it. A criminal prosecution such as 
this is not a game. It incorporates a moral content and an ultimate 
concern with guilt or innocence that are inconsistent with permitting the 
accused to say, "I didn' t do it, but if! did, the government tricked me into 
it. " 168 
In response to the argument that the inconsistent defense 
doctrine should not be applied in the entrapment area, as it is 
generally not applied elsewhere in the criminal area, some 
courts have gone out of their way to find that the entrapment 
context is different. See, for example, United States v. Smith 16Y 
where the point was discussed. 
The doctrine facilitates the truth-finding function of a criminal trial and 
saves the prosecutor from presenting essentially two cases against the 
defendant , one relating to the offense and the other relating to predispos-
ition prior to the offense . " the unusual nature of the entrapment 
defense, focusing on the state of mind of the defendant prior to commis-
sion of the offense justifies this requirement. 
Some courts still follow closely the traditional view regard-
ing inconsistent defenses in criminal cases where the key de-
fense is entrapment. In these courts, the defendant may be 
166 !d. at 485. 
167 See. e.g., Illinois v. Gould, 478 N.E .2d 553 (Ill. 1985); see generally Groot, 
note 1 supra; Note. "Denial of the Crime and the Availability of the Entrapment 
Defense in the Federal Courts," 22 B.C.L. Rev. 911 (1981); Comment, "Assertion of 
Inconsistent Defenses in Entrapment Cases, " 1975 Utah L. Rev. 962; United States 
v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1170-1172 & nn. 12-18 (2d Cir. 1980). 
168 United States v. Rey , 706 F.2d 145, 147 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 764 
U.S. 1038. This ruling, of course, would no longer appear to have significant 
precedential value as a result of the Fifth Circuit 's en banc decision in the Henry 
case , 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. J984) (en banc). 
169 757 F.2d 1161,1167-1168 (lIth Cir. J985). 
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required to affirmatively make admissions l70 and these admis-
sions will have to go to all key elements of the offenses charged. 
Several recent cases demonstrate the point. In United States v. 
Ranzoni, 171 the defendant was charged with receiving liquor 
that had been stolen from an interstate shipment. 172 He made 
two claims regarding the charge. First, he said that he did not 
know the goods were stolen. Second, he claimed he had been 
entrapped into committing the crime by a government agent. 
The court rejected the defense contention summarily. 
We finally have no difficulty in disposing of [his] entrapment argument. 
[He) failed to admit each and every element of the § 2315 violation with 
which he was charged, a necessary prerequisite to raising an entrapment 
defense. Since [he) did not admit that he knew the liquor was stolen, he 
could not assert his entrapment defense at trial and cannot raise it on 
appeal. 173 
The Third Circuit made the statement even more explicit by 
noting that the entrapment "defense requires admission of guilt 
of the crime charged and all of its elements, including the 
required mental state. "174 
Perhaps the court to most strictly follow the inconsistent 
defense principle is the Arizona Supreme Court. In Arizona v. 
Nilsen,175 the court noted that it had "consistently held that to 
avail himself of the defense of entrapment, a defendant must 
admit all the elements of the offense." 176 Presumably recogniz-
ing the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination implications of a 
requirement that the defendant take the stand and admit guilt, 
the court nevertheless made an admission requirement. 
We agree that the defendant need not take the stand in order to assert the 
defense of entrapment, but we cannot see how one can passively admit 
to the elements of the offense. This admission must be made in some 
affirmative manner and cannot be assumed from a defendant's silence. If 
170 Thus raising some significant questions under the Fifth Amendment Self-
Incrimination Clause. See text accompanying notes 177, 191 infra. 
171 732 F.2d 555 (6th Cir. 1984). 
172 18 U.S.C . § 2315. 
17) 732 F.2d at 560. 
174 United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 514 (3d Cir. 1981), cerl. denied. 464 
U.S. 1039. 
175 657 P.2d 419 (Ariz. 1983). 
1761d. at 420. 
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the defendant does not wish to take the stand, he may, for example, offer 
to stipulate to the admission ... if, as here, the state refuses the offered 
stipulation the defendant can have his admission of the elements read 
into evidence ... [no entrapment defense will be allowed, however, 
where the defendant] sat mute and made no active admission of the 
elements. 177 
Most courts today, though, which follow the inconsistent 
defense principle do not apply the rule as strictly as these 
opinions. In particular, three chief "limitations" or "excep-
tions" consistently are used to Jessen the impact of the incon-
sistent defense doctrine. 
The first limitation applies to the case in which the defendant 
admits that he committed certain acts made unlawful under the 
statute (selling the drugs, receiving the stolen goods, etc.) but 
that he did not have the requisite state of mind required by the 
law. In addition, he argues that if the jury disagrees with his 
position, it should at least find that he could not be held for the 
crime because he was unlawfully induced into selling the drugs 
or receiving the goods by government agents. This limitation is 
a popular one. As noted in one recent Pennsylvania case, the 
supposed "inconsistency is, in fact, illusory." 178 That is, the 
jury is simply being asked to find two things. One, that the 
government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant had the necessary intent; two, that even if the intent 
was present, the government entrapped the defendant into 
committing the acts necessary for the crime. Where the defen-
dant admits the commission of the acts, but disputes the evi-
dence as to intent, most courts do not apply the inconsistent 
defense doctrine and instead allow the entrapment question to 
go to the jury. 179 A case illustrative of the point is California v. 
177 Jd. 
178 Pennsylvania v. McGuire, 488 A.2d 1144, 1150 (Pa. 1985). The result would, of 
course, be different if the other "defense" was not lack of intent but something which 
became a clearly inconsistent position. The example given in the McGuire case was 
alibi. These defenses would seem always to be inconsistent. See generally Martinez 
v. New Mexico, 580 P.2d 968, 971 (N .M. 1978). 
179 [A]ppellant' s testimony is susceptible to several interpretations which would 
support an acquittal: (1) he did not possess the requisite legal intent, i.e., knowl-
edge of the package's contents, and (2) regardless of any knowledge the appellant 
may have had concerning the package's contents, the agents' conduct was "de-
signed to induce [his] belief" that delivery of the parcel then was lawful. Whether 
he did or did not know, or whether he was entrapped into committing the crimes, 
are both reasonable conclusions based upon legitimate inferences supported by 
the testimony. Because both constructions may be valid, there is no logical 
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Barraza 180 where the defendant was convicted of selling heroin. 
He conceded that he had sold the heroin, but challenged the 
government's proof with respect to the intent requirement. The 
court allowed the additional entrapment defense. 
Further, such a defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's 
theory .... His defense of denial did not extend to the inculpatory act 
alleged-providing the agent with a note to facilitate her heroin purchase 
transaction with another-but only to the intent with which such act was 
committed. He claimed only that he did not intend to participate in a 
heroin sale when he provided the agent with the note. He does not 
subvert his position in arguing, "and irrespective of my intent, the 
overzealous law enforcement conduct directed at me constitutes en-
trapment. " 181 
Perhaps the leading case in the area is the Fifth Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Greenfield. 182 There, the defendant 
was charged with dispensing narcotics for improper purposes. 
He admitted that he dispensed the drugs but denied any criminal 
intent. He further made the standard argument that any improp-
er intent that he might have had resulted from entrapment on 
the part of the government agent who had purchased the drugs. 
The court addressed the argument in some detail. 
The sole contested issue at trial was the intent with which the acts were 
committed. The defendant strenuously asserted that the prescriptions 
... were for a legitimate medical purpose and within the course of his 
professional practice. Necessarily, the issue of criminal intent or guilty 
knowledge was a factual issue for the jury to resolve on the basis of 
circumstantial evidence under the totality of the circumstances. It was a 
subjective determination. 
We do not believe that it is impermissibly inconsistent under these 
circumstances for a defendant also to argue that to the extent that the 
jury may find culpability on his part, he was entrapped. The defendant 
may say, "1 did not go so far as to prescribe drugs without a legitimate 
medical purpose, but to the extent that you find that I did , I was 
entrapped." ... [I]t is permissible for the defendant to argue to the jury 
that he was entrapped. That is, he may argue he did not knowingly 
reason to prefer one to the total exclusion of the other; the appellant is entitled to 
have the issue submitted to and decided by a jury. 
McGuire, 488 A.2d at 1151. 
180 591 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1979). 
181 [d. at 956. 
182 554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 860. 
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dispense the drugs without a legitimate medical purpose or, alterna-
tively, he may argue that to the extent that he may have prescribed 
without a legitimate medical purpose, he was not predisposed to do 
SO.'83 
The strict inconsistent defense theory traditionally has ap-
plied whether the defendant testified or not, so long as the 
defendant did not admit to all the elements of the crime 
charged}S4 Many courts today, however, are willing to allow 
the entrapment defense to be raised even if the defendant did 
not make such an admission as long as substantial evidence 
regarding entrapment enters the case through the prosecution's 
evidence. In such a case, a number of courts say that there 
simply is no inconsistency of defenses being alleged by the 
defendant; rather, the government has raised the issue. 
In that situation a defendant may assert his or her own defense and still 
ask that the jury consider the possibility of entrapment as raised by the 
government itself. The availability of both defenses does not result from 
inconsistent statements made by the defendant and does not unduly 
burden the government, because the prosecution brings the issue into 
the case. '8S 
The Fifth Circuit in Sears v. United States '86 explained the 
rationale for this rule, a rationale that at least hints at a due 
process basis. 
We do not think it is impermissibly inconsistent for defendant to deny 
the acts charged, yet urge the court on motion for acquittal that the 
government's own evidence establishes entrapment as a matter of law. 
Similarly, the defendant is entitled to have a charge adjusted to the 
evidence, and if the government injects evidence of entrapment into the 
case, the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed that if they find 
that he committed the acts charged, they must further consider whether 
he was entrapped into committing them. We feel that the ultimate goal of 
the criminal trial, the ascertainment of truth, permits no other course. A 
criminal defendant should not forfeit what may be a valid defense, nor 
should the court ignore what may be improper conduct by law enforce-
183 [d. at 183. 
184 United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1314 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 
U.S. 1118. 
185 United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161 (11th Cir. 1985); see also United States 
v. Haimowitz, 752 F.2d 1561, 1573-1574 (lIth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, __ U.S. 
186 343 F.2d 139 (5th eir. 1965). 
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ment officers, merely because the defendant elected to put the govern-
ment to its proof. 187 
Although not common today, some courts continue to ad-
here to the view that the entrapment defense can only be raised 
by admission of the defendant, affirmatively, of the commission 
of the offense. ISS See, for instance, the statement by the Sixth 
Circuit in United States v. Whitley:189 "Whitley did not testify, 
admit the acts or present any evidence whatsoever. To rely on 
the defense of entrapment, the defendant must admit all ele-
ments of the offense. " 190 
Such a strong adherence to the inconsistent defense doctrine 
raises serious policy and constitutional questions. On the policy 
side, it is difficult to understand why some courts absolutely 
insist that the defendant affirmatively raise evidence for the 
defense when the government's evidence raises a triable issue 
concerning entrapment. There is no other area of the law re-
garding affirmative defenses that is treated accordingly. More-
over, with respect to the constitutionality of such a require-
ment, it would seem as if two concerns would be most acute: 
Does the requirement shift the burden of proof impermissibly 
from the government to the defendant with respect to the state-
of-mind requirement, and under the due process clause can such 
a restriction apply if it requires the defendant to offer tes-
timony? The court in United States v. Henry stated the con-
cerns very well: 
The defendant is not required to testify or to concede guilt in order to 
pursue the entrapment theory .... Any other holding would .. raise a 
serious Fifth Amendment question." In no other area of law does the 
defendant lose the right to put the government to its proof solely because 
he wishes the jury to determine whether he should be acquitted based on 
relevant evidence in the record. If the defendant does not testify , it is not 
his admission of criminality that triggers the jury's obligation to consider 
the entrapment defense. It is triggered by the presence of sufficient 
evidence of inducement and predisposition in the record to raise an 
187Jd. at 143-144; see also Young v. Alabama, 469 So. 2d 683, 690 (Ala. 1985). 
188 The view , of course, would be very strong in a state such as Arizona which is 
so stringent with regard to its requirement that the defendant affinnatively offer 
evidence (either as testimony or a stipulation) on the entrapment issue. See Arizona 
v. Nilsen, note 175 supra , 657 P.2d at 424. 
189 734 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1984). 
190/d. at 1139. 
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entrapment issue. If this were not so, the defendant's right to have the 
jury evaluate all the relevant evidence and to consider every issue 
controlling the guilt-innocence determination would depend on his will-
ingness to confess in whole or part. '9' 
The final limitation applies in cases where, at first blush, it 
appears there are inconsistent defenses involving entrapment; 
upon analysis, however, the defenses do not turn out to be truly 
inconsistent or contradictory. In such cases, almost always 
involving conspiracy, the entrapment claim is normally al-
lowed. There are a few principal cases in the area which will 
demonstrate the point. The first is Henderson v. United 
States 192 where the defendant was charged with conspiracy. He 
denied any participation in conspiracy but admitted committing 
certain overt acts that were charged in the indictment. His claim 
was that he had been entrapped into committing the overt acts, 
though he denied that he had actually participated in the illicit 
agreement. A court could thus view the defendant as not being 
guilty, either because he did not agree to commit a crime or 
because he was entrapped into committing the charged overt 
acts. These two defenses simply were not inconsistent, as they 
did not "necessarily disprove" one another. "The defendant 
could admit operating the illicit still, deny being a party to the 
conspiracy charged, and still defend on the ground that such 
overt acts as he did commit were done as a result of entrap-
ment. "193 
In United States v. Smith,194 the defendant was convicted of 
selling narcotics unlawfully. Here, the claim was a bit different. 
He admitted participating in the unlawful scheme, but asserted 
that he had purchased the narcotics as an agent for another 
person and thus was not an unlawful "seller" under the stat-
ute. 195 The defendant was permitted to make the entrapment 
191 749 F.2d 203, 21l (5th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Stanley, 765 F.2d 
1224, 1234 (lith Cir. 1985). 
192 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956). 
1931d. at 173. 
194 407 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1969), cert . denied, 397 U.S. 949. 
19S Under the statute, there was no liability ifthe defendant purchased as an agent 
for another, as opposed to purchasing for himself in order to sell to others. The law 
technically dealt with the sale of narcotics without making demand of a written 
purchase order. 
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defense because it did not disprove or conflict with the agency 
defense under the statute. 
By the defense in the instant case the appellant was in effect saying that, 
although he participated in the transaction, his role was that of buyer's 
agent, but whatever his role was he perfonned it as a result of entrap-
ment. Under these circumstances the defenses of not guilty and entrap-
ment are not so inconsistent that entrapment clearly would not be 
available, and the circumstahces here could reasonably have been con-
sidered by the trial judge as a departure from the normal situation where 
the two defenses would be wholly inconsistent. 196 
The chief difficulty with the defense of a lack of conflict is 
that in most cases, as a matter of fact, the claim cannot be 
sustained. That is, apart from the other exceptions listed above, 
the defenses are indeed in conflict or are inconsistent. See, for 
instance, an Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Smith. 197 
The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine. He raised two very different defenses. The first was 
that he did not conspire with anyone other than the government 
agents, thus not creating an illegal conspiracy.198 The second 
defense was that if he did conspire with persons other than the 
government agents, he was induced by those government 
agents to do so. As stated by the court, a clear conflict existed 
and entrapment would not be allowed as a defense. 
It is difficult to imagine two defenses more inconsistent than these two 
relied upon by Smith. If the jury were to believe that Smith did not 
conspire with non-agents, it could not simultaneously find that agents 
had entrapped him into conspiring with others. In addition , since the 
alleged offense in this case, conspiracy, looks to a state of mind, agree-
ment, as its actus reus, Smith has not even admitted the criminal act as 
alleged by the government, much less the criminal intent. 199 
In spite of cases such as Smith, considerable policy and 
constitutional arguments can be raised against strict enforce-
196 407 F.2d at 204. 
197 757 F.2d 1161 (lIth Cir. 1985). 
198 In the majority of jurisdictions, a "true" agreement must be present with two 
or more persons actually intending to commit a crime and agreeing to do so. The 
presence of government agents will defeat the agreement requirement if only one 
individual actually intends to commit the crime. See P. Marcus, The Prosecution and 
Defense of Criminal Conspiracy Cases § 2.04 (1978). 
199 757 F.2d at 1169. 
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ment ofthe inconsistent defense rule. Particularly, in states that 
have adopted the objective theory of entrapment, judges may 
well be willing to allow inconsistent defenses involving entrap-
ment to be asserted. Still, even in those jurisdictions that pur-
port to apply the inconsistent defense limitation, few apply the 
rule strictly. As a general matter, there are numerous excep-
tions to the rule which have eliminated the harshness of the rule 
in most situations. 
Conclusion 
The three problems discussed in this article-burden of 
proof, questions of law/fact, inconsistent defenses-are pro-
cedural in nature. Nevertheless, they are often crucial in the 
determination of entrapment cases. Particularly in jurisdictions 
that have adopted the subjective-predisposition test, courts may 
consider these problems in order to look to government conduct 
in resolving entrapment questions. These three procedural de-
vices create opportunities for prosecutors, defense counsel, as 
well as trial judges to explore the relationship between the two 
entrapment tests in ways that are often crucial to the outcome of 
important cases. 
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